Lecture 5: access consciousness

— "seeing" vs. "seeing as", revisited

— checks and balances

— access is key

— the neural correlates of consciousness

— the last word on qualia

"seeing" revisited

A close-up photograph of a common bay scallop Aequipecten irradians, showing two of its eyes. What looks like teeth are actually tiny fleshy tentacles that serve as a filter and can sense touch.

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"seeing as" revisited

Unless you see some of the boulders here as lions, you are highly likely to be thrown out of the genetic pool.


To be seen as lions, a handful of pixels must be re-represented as such.

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checks and balances

The most flexible, and therefore most powerful, approach to thinking before doing takes more than re-representing the inputs conceptually before committing to a course of action.

A concept-rich system that is capable of "seeing as" is still prone to a certain kind of occasional (at best) or endemic (at worst) stupidity — the kind that stems from the lack of checks and balances on cognition in the standard, closed-loop perception-thinking-action scheme of things.

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thinking ahead

In describing a hierarchy of sophistication levels that may be discerned in the ability to think ahead, Dennett (1995) writes:

Skinnerian creatures ask themselves, "What should I do next?" and haven't a clue how to answer until they have taken some hard knocks.

Popperian creatures make a big advance by asking themselves, "What should I think about next?" before they ask themselves, "What should I do next?"

Gregorian creatures take a further big step by learning how to think better about what they should think about next — and so forth, a tower of further internal reflections with no fixed or discernible limit.

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access to information is key

Access to information is the core computational issue in reflexive consciousness, just as it is in attention and in phenomenal awareness.


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some of the modes of access to the sensory world

Attention without phenomenal experience or consciousness

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some of the modes of access to the sensory world

Phenomenal experience without attention or consciousness

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some of the modes of access to the sensory world

Consciousness without attention or phenomenal experience

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participatory vs. representative democracy

Haudenosaunee Athens USA

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access in vision (Lamme, 2003)

Change blindness in an abstract scene, and the role of attention.

When the to be changed item is cued in advance (b), subjects perform almost 100% correct.

However, when subjects are cued after the disappearance of Stimulus 1 but before the onset of Stimulus 2 (c), they perform almost as well — they seem to have stored all the items, whose representations persist until overwritten by the subsequent scene.

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access in vision

Four models of visual awareness and its relation to attention.

According to (d), CB and IB are not necessarily failures of consciousness, but of conscious memory. In other words, we are 'conscious' of many inputs but, without attention, this conscious experience cannot be reported and is quickly erased and forgotten.


(Support from the CB cueing experiment: apparently, after the first display has disappeared, a neural representation of almost the whole scene is still present and attention can select from this representation to store the relevant item in working memory. After the onset of stimulus 2, this representation has vanished, as cueing at that time does not help.)

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access in vision

Attentional selection is a convolution of memory and processing. Selection is necessary when two stimuli (labelled A, B) reach the brain but only one response is possible. Competition, typically at the level of the extrastriate areas, prevents most inputs from reaching output areas of the brain.

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access in vision

Left: a visual stimulus activates the primary cortical area for vision in the occipital cortex.

Middle: activity spreads to higher-order visual areas in the parietal and temporal lobes.

Right: recurrent interaction between these areas results in a widespread pattern of activity that corresponds to the animal becoming able to report perceiving the stimulus.


Not indicated in this diagram are: the prefrontal cortex, which participates in attentional selection and in working memory (two key functional components of access consciousness), and the superior colliculus, the subcortical midbrain area that plays a key role in generating phenomenal experience.

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access in vision

Phenomenal vs. access awareness [according to Lamme, 2003]: interaction between recurrent processing and mechanisms of attentional selection.

Competition between the representations of multiple stimuli (A, B) can prevent the feedforward transfer from V1 to the executive areas of all but a few stimuli (here, A). At lower levels, however, simultaneous representations (of both A and B) might exist.

Feedforward activation (green dots), both of selected (i.e. attended) and non-selected inputs, is unconscious, even though it might trigger or modify behavior.

Meanwhile, neurons in activated regions start to engage in recurrent interactions, which are accompanied by increased activity or synchronous firing (yellow dots). This produces phenomenal [I would say, access. -SE] awareness of the visual inputs (and iconic memory after stimulus removal).

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the neural correlates of consciousness

It is probable that at any moment some active neuronal processes in your head correlate with consciousness, while others do not; what is the difference between them?

Francis Crick and Christof Koch (1998)

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Visual discrimination task with metacontrast masking (Lau and Passingham, 2006).

The stimuli were presented on a black background. The mask overlaps with part of the contour of the target without leaving gaps or overlapping with the target spatially.

After the presentation of the target and the mask, the participants were first asked to decide whether a diamond or a square was presented. Then they had to indicate whether they actually saw the target or whether they simply guessed the answer.

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A dissociation between awareness and performance in the metacontrast discrimination task:


Above: behavioral study.
Below: behavioral results from an fMRI study.

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Activity in the mid-DLPFC reflects visual consciousness.

The activity in this area is higher in the long SOA condition than in the short SOA condition, despite the fact that the two conditions did not yield different discrimination accuracy. There were, however, more trials during which the stimuli were classified by the participants as consciously seen in the long SOA condition than in the short SOA condition.


The plot shows the time courses of the hemodynamic activity in the two conditions, as measured by the percentage of signal change from baseline (average over 13 participants, and the error bar represents one SEM).

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the neural correlates of consciousness

Binocular rivalry ensues when the left and the right eyes are presented simultaneously with incompatible stimuli, as in this example.

In this condition, one of the two stimuli is usually suppressed; sometimes the two are combined in a patchwork fashion, with different pieces coming from the different images.

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Right amygdala neuron that follows the subjective percept (Kreiman et al., 2002).

(a) Stimulus presentation: an image is presented monocularly for 1,000 ms. The same image then is flashed onto the same ipsilateral eye while a different image is flashed to the contralateral eye for 500 ms. (Left) A picture of Clinton is presented monocularly, and a black and white pattern is later flashed onto the other eye. (Right) The pattern is presented monocularly, and Clinton is flashed to the contralateral eye.

(b) Subjective percept. (Left) The picture of Clinton is suppressed during the binocular period by the pattern. (Right) The picture of Clinton perceptually suppresses the pattern.

(c) This neuron responded selectively to Clinton among 49 different stimuli. (Left) Clinton shown first; (Right) ineffective stimulus shown first.

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Right amygdala neuron that follows the subjective percept.

(d-f) Responses of the same neuron to a different image of Clinton.

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another neuron that follows the percept

Responses of a neuron in the right amygdala that showed a selective response to four different faces from a set of 42 different stimuli. For two of those stimuli, we did not have a sufficient number of presentations during the binocular period. We therefore show the average response only to the other two stimuli (a photograph of Paul McCartney and one of the Ekman faces).

(a) Responses in those cases where the effective stimuli were shown monocularly and perceptually suppressed during the flash by an ineffective stimulus.

(b) Responses during those trials in which an ineffective stimulus was shown monocularly and the effective stimuli were flashed.

The cell responded if and only if the effective stimulus was perceived subjectively.

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unit statistics

n is the total number of units recorded in each location.

Amy, amygdala;

Hipp, hippocampus;

EC, entorhinal cortex;

PHG, parahippocampal gyrus.

"Category selective" indicates the units that were category-selective during the monocular presentation and were tested during the flash presentation with a sufficient number of repetitions and stimuli.

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seeing red

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seeing red

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qualia are brain states

Qualia can be induced in humans in the absence of sensory input, by direct cortical stimulation.

In one study, Kupers et al. (2006) used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the occipital lobe to induce tactile sensations in blind subjects. The subjects had been trained to use a sensory substitution device — an electrode array placed on the tongue — to determine the orientation of visual stimuli, which were captured by a camera and fed to the electrode array.

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qualia depend on experience

The possibility of inducing tactile qualia in the congenitally blind (but not in blindfolded controls trained to be equally good in the orientation task) by stimulating the cortical region that in sighted people houses the primary visual area indicates that experience plays a critical role in determining the representational role of the cortex, and supports the identification of qualia with representational states.

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almost the last word on qualia

A quale is a representational state. More precisely, it is a point in the kind of multidimensional space that singles out certain perceptual dimensions of the stimulus. Such tuning arises naturally through perceptual learning, while the system that harbors the qualia is exposed to stimulation.

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almost the last word on qualia

A quale is a representational state. More precisely, it is a point in the kind of multidimensional space that singles out certain perceptual dimensions of the stimulus. Such tuning arises naturally through perceptual learning, while the system that harbors the qualia is exposed to stimulation.

The dispute [...] comes down to our attitude to phenomenology. Certainly walking in a forest, seeing the blue of the sky, the green of the trees, the red of the track, one may find it hard to believe that our qualia are merely points in a multidimensional space. But perhaps that is what it is like (to use a phrase that can be distrusted) to be aware of a point in a multidimensional space.

J. C. C. Smart (2004)

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almost the last word on qualia

A quale is a representational state. More precisely, it is a point in the kind of multidimensional space that singles out certain perceptual dimensions of the stimulus. Such tuning arises naturally through perceptual learning, while the system that harbors the qualia is exposed to stimulation.

A quale is felt when the representational state that defines it is accessed by the rest of the cognitive system. Although such access is straightforward to implement, it may require some potentially complex wiring, because a point in a multidimensional neural space exists physically as a particular pattern of activation over the neurons that span the space; leave one out, and you drop a dimension.

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the last word on qualia

What is it like to be a bat? In a highly influential paper by that title, Nagel (1974) argued that what it feels like to be a bat will remain forever a mystery to any creature not endowed with an echolocating sense.

On the objective level, this is really a non-issue:

"There is no need for a new discipline of objective phenomenology. We already have such a discipline. It is called psychophysics" (A. Clark, 2000).

On the subjective level, the problem boils down to the difference between first-person and third-person access to phenomenal states — a difference that is illusory, insofar as phenomenal states are virtual constructs.

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summary

The representational theory of consciousness tells us what experiencing life as a primate consists of objectively (both in computational and in neural terms), while also accounting for the cline in our subjective willingness to accept explanations of what it is like to be various other sentients — from sonar-wielding bats and dolphins, to scallops, to representative democracies.

In the latter case, common sense fails utterly, but the scientific understanding stands firm.